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Abstract 
In the EU 28, the Roma people are the largest European minority. Unevenly spread, having in almost all the countries a 
peripheral social position and often generating harsh problems due to this position, the Roma had got, in the last two decades, a 
clear conscience of their ethnic identity. Moreover, the Roma elites are speaking about a “Roma stateless (European) nation”. In 
this respect, the Roma became a geopolitical factor that cannot be neglected.  
The paper presents a series of results of a field research on Roma identity, achieved this year in urban and rural areas form nine 
Romanian counties and in Bucharest. There were more than 60 in depth interviews with adult persons that identified themselves 
as Roma, belonging both to the elite (high educated persons, occupying official and/or prestige positions) and to ordinary social 
classes. 
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1. Introduction 
The last 50 years brought several major changes in the whole world. I shall briefly name those which directly 
influenced the context of the identity shift of Roma population from Romania in particular and from Europe, in 
general. 
Economy is a first level of change. During the second half of the XX century the gross world product increased 
seven times (Maddison, 2006). As a comparison, the same indicator raised, from 1913 until 1950, only two times. 
Therefore, the world has become much richer in a short time. The growth in wealth was as unequal as it was 
spectacular. Statistics also show that the deepening of polarisation between rich and poor countries, as well as 
between rich and poor people in a country (Milanovic, 2002). 
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We should say that „wealth” as it is reflected by indicators such as the gross product is not noticed by an 
individual (5). More important than the wealth of a country is the welfare of the citizens in that country. And here 
we mean the guaranteed access to a clearly defined level of welfare. This welfare level is defined besides abstract 
notions (such as education, life expectancy etc.) by easy access to concrete goods: place to live, car, electronic 
appliances, clothes, food, and entertainment. From this point of view, during the last 60 years took place an 
extraordinary polarisation between the West† and the rest of the world.  
A second level regards technology and we shall only refer here to the communication technologies: cinema and 
television (especially for 1950-1990) and lately mobile telephony and internet. All these communication media 
showed to the whole world, in the most direct way, the wealth and, more important, the welfare of the West. In a 
certain way, for the „rest of the world”, rather than the Western welfare, there exists the image of the Western 
welfare.   
The third level is the ideological one. Although we do not have quantified data, it is reasonable to admit that 
similar to the dynamic of goods production in the West during the last decades it was the „production” of ideologies 
or, more precisely, the dissemination in the public space of some projects to transform politically, economically and 
socially human communities (Baradat, 2012). We do not refer here to systematic, academic scientific research but to 
ideas debated in an amateur or even vulgar manner in mass media. Among these, the most important and interesting 
from our perspective is multiculturalism (Inglis, 1995). Initially launched to manage inter-ethnic and/or inter-
religious tensions in immigration countries such as Canada, Australia, USA, this ideology entered, especially after 
1990, in the political discourse in West-Europe, i.e. in countries where immigrants had not represented until then a 
massive phenomenon. 
At this point, the debate became harsh. The supporters pleaded for the need to avoid the discrimination of 
immigrants by the majority. But this rapidly lead to an extreme version of an atomised society, where some groups 
become self-sufficient and interact very little or not at all with the rest of the society. This vision gave way to 
reactions from theorists (Sartori, 2007) and from political leaders (Daily Mail, 2011), as well. The political 
rejections of multiculturalism only lead to increased media exposure. The frequency of the topic in the media shows 
its importance. By extension, the message, the public message can be read as: each group has the right to be 
recognised as such and to live by its own rules wherever in the world.  
Finally, the fourth level is the political one. After the Second World War the world was separated in two blocks. 
The cold war also meant an obstacle for the free movement of people. This obstacle appeared not only between the 
two ideological blocks but also within these for some reasons we shall not discuss here. 
During the Cold War the free movement only existed in some directions controlled by stronger states. The Single 
European Act is the first document which states the free movement as a right given by the belonging of the 
individual to a supra-national organisation. From this perspective, it is easy to understand that the fall of 
communism and the free access of people from East Europe to the Occident meant as well the overcome of an 
obstacle and its symbolic value is much more important.  
We presented these four levels of recent changes in the last 30-40 years in order to underline the existence of a 
set of vectors that influenced the deprived populations, determining them: 1. to perceive the welfare of the Occident, 
2. to want it, 3. to act upon it, and 4. to consider this as a right. This pattern applies in general (vis-à-vis groups or 
individuals in the whole world), but especially to Roma ethnics in ex-communist now EU member countries.  
After 1990 the Roma issue became important for the West firstly because of population de-homogenisation in ex-
communist countries. Communism had treated population in an egalitarian and homogenous manner. As this 
treatment had been imposed administratively, when this constrain disappeared the various social segments redefined 
and repositioned themselves on „natural” basis. 
As a consequence, during the early 1990, at least in Romania, a „natural segregation” of the Roma took place in 
the very fluid social context at that time. Here is not the place to analyse the causes and evolutions of these 
phenomena. We just intend to show the existence of inter-ethnic conflicts between Roma and the majority 
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population, conflicts which were shown in Western mass media and generated a direct support action in favour of 
Roma (Cret, 2012 & Mediafax, 1993). 
Later, in the 2000s and especially after the accession to EU of ex-communist states and the elimination of visas, 
the Roma issue appeared more often in the Western mass media and on the agenda of the EU institutions and of the 
rich Western states. In fact, this happened because among the vast number of economic migrants from East Europe, 
the Roma migrants shocked the public opinion because of their level of poverty and because of their unusually 
intense, aggressive and ostensive practices (begging, theft, illegal camps). The debates over Roma communities 
intensified accordingly.  
In brief, after 1990 a specific context existed in Europe; on one hand, the fall of communism and the political re-
configuration allowed the debate over the status and rights of minorities. On the other hand, the economic 
polarisation generated a significant migration. In this context, the Roma population and especially its elites were 
compelled to an identity self-awareness and identity reconstruction process, as a reaction to the pressure created by 
mass media, institutions and public opinion. In this process, there exist the conditions that the ethnic and cultural 
identity may converge to a national identity. Such an identity may create specific trans-national organisations, which 
could connect the European Roma communities in an entity with complex social, economic and politic functions. 
2. Context and methodology 
Given the context, after the fall of communism, the Roma communities from Europe and especially from Eastern 
countries have become a favourite research topic for sociologists and anthropologists and a target group for the 
NGOs concerned by minorities’ rights. After 1990, in Romania, too, a lot about history of local Roma, about the 
present situation and about future perspectives was written and published. Apart from the classic works (Achim, 
1998; Mărginean, 2001; Zamfir, E. & Zamfir, C., 1993; Zamfir, C. & Preda, M., 2002), relatively recent several 
consistent studies (Fleck & Rughiniş, 2008; Asociaţia femeilor rome din România, 2011) were made, studies we use 
in our present research. The research of Fleck and Rughiniş is by our knowledge the largest quantitative and 
qualitative research on Roma minority from Romania, presenting an exhaustive picture of Roma communities in the 
2010s. Starting from this research, we made a qualitative research, where we had three main objectives: 
1. Which are the identity strong elements – in the opinion of ethnics – which represent a condition of belonging 
to the ethnicity (how can be established if someone is or not Roma/gipsy); 
2. If identity values/elements (language, clothing, occupations, customs) are considered ‚transformable’ by the 
respondents; 
3. If there exist the opinion or representation that the Roma ethnicity has a certain unity at national, European or 
world level and if this unity could become in the future a political entity, such as, for example, an European 
(stateless) nation. 
From the methodological point of view, the instrument used in our survey was the semi-structured or 
unstructured interview (Chelcea, 2004.) with adults declaring themselves as Roma ethnics. We aimed to select not 
necessarily a representative sample (difficult to gather for a qualitative poll) but a relative coverage of all areas of 
Romania and of almost all types of Roma communities. In this sense, interviews were held in 10 counties and in 
Bucharest, with 67 persons from 16 communities and, as well, with Roma intellectuals holding official or 
prestigious positions in institutions or in their communities. 
The interviewing of personalities (Mădălin Voicu, Luminiţa Cioabă, Daniel Vasile, Delia Grigore, Vasile 
Ionescu, Mihaela Zătreanu, Gheorghe Răducanu) were programmed, the respondents being informed in advance 
about the topics to be discussed. For the present paper, these interviews had the role of giving a deeper 
understanding and at the same time to norm the field observations. 
As for the interviews with ordinary people, we benefited from the intermediation of some local authorities who 
walked us in the areas or villages inhabited by Roma, or we spontaneously approached groups of persons whose 
clothing indicated the ethnic belonging. The programmed or intermediated interviews were longer (1-4 hours) and 
more detailed and usually took place in the lodgings of respondents. The ‘spontaneous’ interviews were naturally 
shorter (15-30 min.), took place in public places (parking, mall, coffee shops) and were less personal and more 
general on Roma situation. However, these interviews also offered relevant information.  
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In the interviews with ordinary people we preferred to talk freely, with substantial diversion from the interview 
guide. However, this approach allowed the creation of trust in the respondents and obtaining information otherwise 
difficult to capture. Another limit is the eventual dis-honesty of respondents. In many cases we felt people were 
suspicious and the answer to some questions (especially those referring to their relation with authorities or about 
respecting the law) were ‘politically correct’. In these cases we returned with reformulations or with the projection 
of the question on an imaginary person. The majority of interviews with ordinary people were held in small groups 
(2-3 persons, husband-wife, father-son, brothers-sisters, friends). We opted for this manner in order to allow 
respondents to be relaxed and to confirm/infirm their affirmations reciprocally. 
3. Results and discussions 
In this paper we present part of the research outcomes, more exactly, those referring to the possibility of 
transforming traditional identity values and to respondents’ perspectives on the short and medium term future, at 
individual and community level.  
First of all we have built a check instrument for the consistency of the variables. From the contact data and the 
field observation, respondents can be grouped according to the variables: tradition, wealth, openness. The 
respondents represented traditional communities (T) or non-traditional (N), wealthy (W) or poor (P), isolated (I) or 
in dynamic contact with other communities (D). On these coordinates, the following matrix results: 
Table 1. Grouping variables matrix. 
TDP NDP 
TDW NDW 
TIW NIW 
TIP NIP 
In addition, we define the variable susceptibility of transformation, meaning the availability of the respective 
community to change. Because our study is strictly qualitative, this variable is 1 (in general, change is accepted), or 
0 (in general, change is not accepted). We emphasize that the susceptibility of transformation does not mean the 
renunciation to tradition, or at least not on short term, from one generation to another. 
By ‘tradition’ we understand the large preservation in communities (at least 3 out ot 4) of the set: language, 
costume, customs (especially those about marriage and kinship) and occupations. In this logic, the tradition-
modernity variable shall be 0 for tradition (for a community where in general traditions are held high with no 
predisposition towards change) and 1 for modernity. 
The second variable is isolation-openness. By this we do not understand isolation-openness towards strangers, 
but geographic isolation or rare economic contacts with other communities. For example, the gabors in Mureş 
county are an isolated community as regards the access of strangers, but very open from the economic point of view, 
their main business being commerce (most of the goods are brought from Hungary, Austria or Germany and sold in 
all Transylvania). This variable shall be 0 for isolation and 1 for openness. 
As for the wealth-poverty variable, operationalisation is more difficult. First of all, we considered wealth as 
relative, strictly by comparison to those of neighbouring communities (usually Romanians). The comparison term 
was the leaders of the Roma community. At the same time, we also considered the self-appreciation (“how do you 
consider yourselves, rich or poor, compared with the Romanian neighbours?”). Therefore, for the beginning we 
considered that a wealthy community is more resistant to change of traditions (value 0) than a poor community 
(value 1). 
With these clarifications, each cell of the matrix can be characterised by the sum of the respective variables. Let 
us notice that from the above matrix we can eliminate TIW and NIW situations because in reality they do not occur 
and even in theory they cannot be figured out. Updating the matrix, the following distribution results: 
Table 2. Updated grouping variables matrix. 
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TDP 2 NDP 3 
TDW 1 NDW 2 
TIP 1 NIP 2 
The matrix results are broadly confirmed by the field observations. A higher predisposition towards change and 
modernisation exists in non-traditional, poor and open Roma communities (miners from Dognecea, Caraş-Severin), 
a moderate predisposition towards change in non-traditional, wealthy and open Roma communities (home-gypsies 
from Grabaţ, Timiş or silver artisans from Giurgiu), predisposition decreasing in case of traditional, poor and open 
Roma communities (home-gypsies from Bereasca, Ploieşti), which is about at the same level with traditional, 
wealthy and open communities (kalderash from Sibiu, gabors from Târgu Mureş) but significantly higher than in 
case of traditional, poor and isolated Roma communities (brick makers from Dudeşti, Brăila). However, it is 
surprising the reduced predisposition towards change in non-traditional, poor and isolated Roma communities 
(„romanianised gypsies”, Mălini, Suceava). 
As it was to be expected, the more a community observed the traditions, the less inclined to change it is. 
Members of traditional communities such as kalderash or gabors are very proud of identity elements (language, 
costumes, customs, traditional occupations) and consider „it is a big sin that a Roma ignores them” or even give up 
on them. Usually, in these communities those who give up on traditional values exclude themselves from the 
community („one of those is no longer accepted by anyone”). However, a significant change of views exists 
depending on age. While older members of traditional communities emphasize the requirement that marriages and 
kinship are arranged only by parents, the younger members consider they can refuse, at least the first marriage 
option they are offered („when I married [my son], he said no to the first two; but I don’t know what I would have 
done if he said no to the third one”). 
As for the wealth of communities, we noticed a surprising fact. In a rich traditional community the inclination to 
change is more reduced compared to a poor traditional community. 
On the other hand, in a non-traditional rich community the predisposition to change is higher than in a poor one. 
In other words, where both tradition and wealth exist, the tendency is to reinforce one another. This aspect is viable 
from the psychological point of view because it allows a pseudo-causality: “if I respect the rules/tradition, then there 
is a reward of this behaviour” and reciprocally, „if I am rich then I can afford to differentiate by observing 
tradition”. 
As shown above, less anticipated is the situation of non-traditional poor communities („romanianized gypsies” 
from poor villages or from peripheries of towns). Here the lack of disposition toward change can be caused by the 
severe poverty which does not allow optimist projections of the future and, at the same time, by the lack of traditions 
which determines a complete dependence on extra-community mechanisms (usually the social aid). 
Almost all the interviewed persons highlighted the perception that in the communist period life was better for the 
Roma people. The two exceptions were businessmen from wealthy, non-traditional communities, practically 
assimilated. These persons do not hide their ethnic identity, but consider it an unessential aspect of their families’ 
life and future. 
Talking about communism, the other respondents appreciated it was a more advanced integration: jobs, 
compulsory primary school, and the daily contacts with the majority. The post-communist period is described on 
one hand as a public recovery of the pride of the ethnic identity (“we were then ashamed to say we are gypsies, now 
we aren’t”), but, on the other hand, it is a vivid perception of a kind of re-isolation. This is expressed by statements 
as: “we left the apartment [in a block of flats] and moved here, in the gypsy neighbourhood, but here no one [of the 
authorities or other people] comes, only at the elections” or “it was better when I was working in the factory, the 
people around knew me as a very good craftsman and I earned a lot…, now I have to seek hard for some work”).  
The future is perceived not as dark as uncertain. The kalderash Roma (generally wealthy and providing a 
prestigious handicraft) admit that in a couple of years it will be very difficult to find clients for their products 
(“people are leaving the villages and less and less make brandy as once”). For the woodcarvers, times already 
changed: “we are making wood tableware no longer, we buy anything we need in the stores, as the Romanians do, 
but we, Roma, are skilful – now we are retailers in the city market”. Towards the authorities’ attempts to revival the 
traditional occupations the opinions are sceptical: “they tell us to go there [at the traditional fairs], ok, but how many 
artisans can go there? Two or three, no more!” 
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The dominant feeling in most of the interviews is that every community should unravel by itself. Relationships 
with other Roma communities are often rejected. In the same time, many people are claiming for “state support”. 
This expectation is not so much an “assisted mentality”, as a reflex of the communist era when the state-owned 
enterprises offered a lot of stable jobs, so as hiring was perceived not so much as easy, but as non-discriminatory.  
Regarding the future projections, the expectations were mostly negative. As we mentioned before, relationships 
with other Roma as well with political leaders are, if no rejected, at least neglected (“all [the political leaders] are 
tracking only their interest… they have stolen the support money [from the EU] and then they did not return” or 
“don’t tell me about Cioabă [a rich and prominent family of kalderash Roma]! Cunning people!” 
However, the interviews with Roma personalities reflect another side of the future. On the one hand, the Roma 
intellectuals think a coalescence of different communities’ interests is possible and required, in order to 
proportionally representing the Roma at national as well as at European level. On the other hand, the intellectuals 
themselves do not agree on the vectors which should provide such coalescence. Some of them (Daniel Vasile, 
Gheorghe Răducanu and other followers of the ideas of Nicolae Gheorghe) support an institutional emancipation on 
the basis of modern human rights theory. Others (Vasile Ionescu) insist upon the necessity of a better knowledge 
and recognition of the deep ethnic and cultural identity considered, in many aspects, unfitted with the modern and, 
therefore, schematic approaches. Both of the groups agree, however, on the cleavages existing between the 
communities as well as between the communities and the political and cultural leaders. 
An interesting result derived from the above, is the evaluation of social distance between Roma and non-Roma 
(gadje) communities. The social distance, as defined by Emory Bogardus in 1925 (Chelcea, 2004.), refers to the 
emotional dimension used by one community to appreciate their neighbours. In recent studies (Karakayali, 2009) a 
distinction was operated between this emotional dimension and the normative dimension, i.e. the rules one 
community observes compared to other community. 
In the present study, we took into consideration this normative aspect by questions such as „what sort of 
connections you have with...” and/or „what sort of ties you should have with...”. The reduced semantic area of 
answers allows a relatively objective evaluation not of the social distance, but of the tendency to increase/decrease 
this distance on short term. One target of the research is in this case to determine the distribution of social distances 
between members of communities, between Roma communities and non-Roma communities. 
The answers in interviews recall the small social distances during communist time among Roma communities 
and between these and non-Roma communities, as well as small social distances among individuals, given the socio-
economic system at that time. Concretely, it was about jobs that many men and even women had in factories, about 
the obligation to put children in school, about the secondary socialisation given by living in a block of flats and, not 
least, about physical proximity. 
The fall of communism was in fact a moment when each community (and within this each individual) started to 
gain a position and a trajectory in a new society as a whole. Of course, some communities had a better start and 
mobility than others. Metaphorically speaking, the evolution of the Roma people in the years that followed the fall 
of communism can be compared with the Olympic marathon race: at the beginning all the runners (i.e. the Roma 
communities) are at the same start line, but after some miles’ run, they are spread along the track. Some of the 
runners (the elites) are leading the race, being “media stars”, but most of them are lonely runners, out of the public’s 
eyes. 
At over twenty years from that moment, we notice an increasing social distance among Roma communities and 
between these and majority communities. On short term, respondents expect a further increase of this distance. 
4. Conclusions 
First of all, the research highlighted that the core identity elements of the Romanian Roma are strongly tied to the 
(extended) family. Language, costume or traditional occupation and handicraft may be observed or not, but the 
ethnic conscience and the customs related to marriage and kinship are running in the family. Family is also the 
instance which decides the changes that are acceptable or not. 
The checking matrix built in order to have a benchmark for the qualitative research shows that the variables 
wealth-poverty, tradition-non-tradition and isolation-openness are not fully independent. For a correct appreciation 
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of the change susceptibility of a community, a thoroughly observation of the context and of the complex community 
interactions with the exterior world is needed.  
The interviews with the Roma intellectuals revealed a phenomenon that we might call “the Roma paradox”. 
This paradox is related to the Russell-Zermelo paradox: by definition, the Roma ethnie/nation is composed by all 
the communities that are not “gadje” ones. On the one hand, Roma identity comes out as a sum/collection of 
identities of the communities/clans. But, on the other hand, in defining communities the difference towards the other 
communities is more important than the difference towards the “gadje”. 
Briefly, the Roma paradox can be stated as follows: Roma people are different enough from others for claiming a 
particular status, but the differences among themselves are an obstacle in establishing that status. 
Moreover, traditional costume, customs, and handicrafts remain inevitably pre-modern identity elements, which 
cannot provide a real basis for building a modern, overall, identity. Language, the only element that could afford 
this, lacks yet the necessary bulk of written culture for building nation-type institutions. On the short term there is no 
trend of a united action towards the idea of building “the Roma nation”. 
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